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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 920411-CA 
Priority No. 16 
-oooOooo-
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Roger Finlayson, hereby submits his 
Petition for Rehearing of the Court of Appeals decision in 
Finlayson v. Finlayson. 237, Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. April 13, 
1994) . 
ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATION 
By his signature below, Michael A. Katz, counsel for Roger 
Finlayson, certifies that this Petition for Rehearing is presented 
in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court Overlooked or Misapprehended Facts and Law in 
Arriving at its Opinion on the Appeal. 
POINT I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, BOTH ON THIS PETITION 
AND ON THE UNDERLYING APPEALS CALLS FOR A REHEARING AND 
NEW DECISION IN THIS MATTER. 
The standard by which the Court of Appeals assesses a petition 
for rehearing is specifically set forth in Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. It states, in pertinent part: "The petition 
shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which the 
petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and 
shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the 
petitioner desires" (emphasis added). Mr. Finlayson here contends 
the Court of Appeals must again review but now uphold the trial 
court's decision as to two key marital assets and/or liabilities, 
to-wit: (1) withdrawals from joint bank accounts to discharge the 
"Hallmark Debt"; and (2) the Lot, and reverse as to a third, the 
Rent Note. 
This Court also recently reiterated the legal standard 
governing review of the trial court's rulings on property and debt 
distribution. The appellate court will only modify an award "if 
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
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preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Watson v. 
Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992). In the context of this 
Petition for Rehearing, it is respectfully urged that the Court of 
Appeals overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact under 
the foregoing standard of review warranting the requested relief. 
POINT II. THIS COURT MUST REVIEW ITS FINDINGS AS TO THE 
HALLMARK DEBT. 
Under the above standards, the most inconsistent and hence 
susceptible to review portion of the Opinion was the finding that 
a remand was appropriate for purposes of equitably reallocating 
sums withdrawn from a joint account to repay the "Hallmark Debt." 
Specifically, Petitioner here argues that the Court of Appeals 
overlooked or misapprehended its own decisions in the recent cases 
of Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 1993) and Baker v. 
Baker. 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Godfrey, the appellant/wife challenged the trial court's 
finding that an obligation actually existed as against a marital 
asset, much as Ms. Finlayson did with reference to the Hallmark 
Debt and these parties' joint bank account. Although the Court of 
Appeals vacated the trial court's finding in Godfrey, it did so on 
the basis of inadequate findings and not because the court "abused 
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its discretion" in permitting discharge of a marital obligation out 
of marital assets as found here in the Finlayson appeal. 
It is difficult to understand how the Court of Appeals found 
an abuse of discretion by Judge Wahlquist in our case considering 
the significantly broad discretion given the trial court in making 
asset and debt allocations. Noteworthy on our facts as involving 
assessing or reducing marital assets by marital debts (as 
accomplished by the trial court here) are Rasband v. Kasband, 752 
P. 2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) (acknowledging the trial court's 
considerable discretion in equitably adjusting the financial and 
property interests of the parties); and Naranio v. Naranio, 751 
P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988) wherein the court found also the 
trier of fact's actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. 
But, most compelling, is Baker v. Baker, supra. Despite the 
fact the loan in favor of a parent was not represented by a written 
instrument nor admitted by the spouse (compare our facts, where 
both an instrument exists and Ms. Finlayson admitted the 
obligation), the court of appeals upheld the trial court's 
determination that the funds were a loan, and therefore part of the 
marital estate. Considering the more persuasive facts above noted 
and present with reference to the Hallmark Debt, it seems clear 
this Court overlooked its own recent opinion in Baker and must, 
therefore, rehear this case. 
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A second facet of this Court1s ruling concerning the Hallmark 
Debt supports Petitioner's contention that "points of law or fact" 
were "overlooked or misapprehended" in the original opinion. At 
237, Utah Adv. Rep. 25, Judge Davis notes Judge Wahlquist's 
adequate findings of fact on the parties7 respective abilities to 
support him or herself. Yet, on the way to finding the trial court 
"abused its discretion in crediting husband's payments to Mina as 
a discharge of a marital debt" the Court assails the inadequacy of 
findings "regarding the propriety or effect of using liquid assets 
of the marital estate to discharge the debt." What additional 
findings were required to support this distribution of marital 
assets other than the parties' ability to support him or herself is 
difficult to imagine. This portion of the appellate opinion serves 
to highlight the inconsistency in treatment of the Hallmark Debt. 
It is found to be a marital liability, yet a remand is ordered for 
further distribution of the estate's liquid assets, including 
amounts withdrawn by Petitioner from the joint account to pay this 
indebtedness. 
Finally, in ordering a reallocation of amounts paid to 
discharge the Hallmark Debt, this Court overlooks the key 
admissions made by Ms. Finlayson during the trial of this action. 
Not only did the Plaintiff acknowledge the underlying indebtedness, 
she admitted requesting Mr. Finlayson to pay the same. She should 
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not now be heard to complain about an allocation of debts and 
liabilities premised upon her husband simply carrying out these 
wishes. Whether this is phrased in terms of estoppel or not, it 
presents another basis to rehear this appeal. 
POINT III. THE "RENT NOTE" IS A MARITAL DEBT (SIMILAR TO 
THE HALLMARK DEBT) AND THE COURT OF APPEALS MUST REVIEW 
ITS RULING THEREON. 
As argued extensively by this Petitioner in his opening brief 
on the cross-appeal, it is difficult to reconcile Judge Wahlquist's 
finding that the Hallmark Debt was marital, whereas the Rent Note 
was not. The only distinction between the two is the fact that the 
Hallmark Debt was traceable into the marriage's largest asset. 
However, that distinction fails to account for the fact that the 
parties received substantial family benefit under the Rent 
obligation in the form of housing. Furthermore, Judge Wahlquist 
found the Rent Note to be bona fide as a matter of fact, yet was 
precluded from finding it "unenforceable" as the Court correctly 
observes, citing Qpenshaw v. Openshaw, 12 P.2d 364, 365 (Utah 
1932). We are thus left with another inconsistent ruling by the 
Court of Appeals, albeit this time upholding a trial court ruling. 
Again, there is a sound basis to rehear this appeal as to the 
finding that the Rent Note is not a marital obligation. 
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POINT IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISPOSITION OF THE LOT AND MUST CORRECT ITS 
OPINION. 
In addressing the Court of Appeals' holding as to whether the 
Lot was marital property, it is once again important to note the 
standard of review. The Appeals Court may substitute its judgment 
for the trial court only if an abuse of discretion or 
misapplication of the law occurred or the trial court's award 
worked a manifest injustice. See, gener al 1 y, Gill v. Gill, 718 
P.2d 779, 780 (Utah 1986). All the while, this Court must afford 
the trial court considerable discretion and cloak its actions with 
a presumption of validity. Id. 
In rejecting Judge Wahlquist's treatment of the Lot, the Court 
of Appeals must surely have overlooked or misapprehended the 
thorough, comprehensive and well-supported LLndings of fart to 
which lip service Is paid at 23 7, Utah Adv. Rep.
 |p /6 
Specified^*., Juage Davis in his opinion, apparently ignored the 
wholesale absence of donative intent on the grantor/Mind's part 
when she executed the subject deed. Roger Finlayson, Mina's 
grandson, Kurt, and Mina herself testified the deed was utilized 
solely to assist i n sel 1 ing the property (Find i ng of Fact 1,2 at 
R. 155-146. ) , Also overlooked by the Court of Appeals were the 
credible explanations as to the motivation behind payment of the 
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property taxes and other actions on Roger's part to maintain the 
property. 
The Court of Appeals must similarly have overlooked pertinent 
legal authority which is even cited in the Finlavson appeal in 
rejecting the quit-claim deed ordered by Judge Wahlquist. Jackson 
v. Jacksonr 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980), stands for the proposition 
that the trial court may compel such conveyances as are incident to 
property distributions. And, the Court of Appeals must have 
misapprehended the import of Openshaw (cited at 237, Utah Adv. 
Rep., 26) in stating Judge Wahlquist was powerless in ordering the 
parties to execute the quit-claim deed to Mina1. While Mina's 
absence as a party to the action prohibits a finding that her debt 
is unenforceable, this is quite different from ordering the two 
parties to these proceedings to execute a quit-claim deed to one of 
their parents. In the former instance, the Court would be 
prejudicing a non-party, whereas in the latter, the Court is simply 
entering an order needed to implement its finding the Lot was not 
a marital asset. 
In closing, and without belaboring the appropriate standard of 
appellate review identified above, Petitioner wishes to emphasize 
1
 Openshaw. supra, is distinguishable as it involved 
ordering one party to the divorce to pay the spouse's attorney's 
fees directly to her counsel, rather than through the traditional 
means of a money judgment in the amount thereof. 
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an important yet somewhat intangible principle overriding a11 
facets of Judge Wahlquist's distribution of assets and liabilities 
in this action,, Tl it principle is equity Because the triaJ court 
made extensive, detailed findings of fact supporting each and every 
conclusion of lam after hearing conflicting and contentious 
testi mony by the p. = xti es ai id other witnesses, the Court of AppcM Is 
is ill-suited to substitute its decision for that of the learned 
and experienced trial judge, The subject debts were admitted by 
She should not continue to benefit from the assets while Mr. 
Finlayson shoulders alJ their burdens. This notion was implicit in 
^ Judge Wall J q uist's nil ings and cannot be "over] ool :ed :: u: 
misapprehended" by the Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Based 01 i tl: le foregoing, Petitioner respectful ] y requests a 
rehearing of the appeal. 
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